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We experimentally investigated the influence of context-based biases, such as 27	
prestige and popularity, on the preferences for quotations. Participants were presented 28	
with random quotes associated to famous or unknown authors (experiment one), or 29	
with random quotes presented as popular, i.e. chosen by many previous participants, 30	
or unpopular (experiment two). To exclude effects related to the content of the 31	
quotations, all participants were subsequently presented with the same quotations, 32	
again associated to famous and unknown authors (experiment three), or presented as 33	
popular or unpopular (experiment four). Overall, our results showed that context-34	
based biases had no (in case of prestige and conformity), or limited (in case of 35	
popularity), effect in determining participants’ choices. Quotations preferred for their 36	
content were preferred in general, despite the contextual cues to which they were 37	
associated. We conclude discussing how our results fit with the well-known 38	
phenomenon of the spread and success (especially digital) of misattributed quotations, 39	
and we draw some more general implications for cultural evolution research.    40	
 41	
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Humans depend on social learning to acquire information and behaviours that 53	
would be otherwise difficult for individuals to learn by themselves. Theoretical 54	
models have shown that to be effective, however, social learning needs to be selective 55	
(Laland, 2004). How do we choose which ideas, beliefs and practices to adopt among 56	
the myriad of options that are available?  57	
Research in cultural evolution suggests we use an inventory of simple 58	
heuristics, often referred to as “social learning strategies” or “cultural transmission 59	
biases”, to assist our decision in respect to what, when, or from whom to copy (Boyd 60	
& Richerson, 1985; Mesoudi, 2011b). An important distinction in this inventory is 61	
made between “context-based biases” and “content-based biases” (Boyd & Richerson, 62	
1985).  63	
This distinction is critical because context-based biases are independent from 64	
the actual properties of the ideas or practices, whereas content-based biases, as the 65	
label suggests, refer to intrinsic characteristics of the cultural traits themselves. 66	
Examples of context-based biases are “copy prestigious individuals” (Henrich & Gil-67	
White, 2001), “copy the majority” (Henrich & Boyd, 1998) or “copy when 68	
uncertain”(Wood et al., 2016). In all cases there is no need for the individual to 69	
directly evaluate the features of the trait to copy. If the majority is doing A in place of 70	
B, then one should copy A, no matter what A is.  71	
Examples of content-based biases are instead “copy traits that carry survival 72	
information” (Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & Flynn, 2015) or “copy traits that elicit 73	
emotional reactions – amusement, for example” (Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & Flynn, 74	
	 4	
2017). Here the features of traits matter. Is A carrying more survival information than 75	
B?  76	
A growing corpus of experimental studies in cultural evolution broadly supports 77	
the sketch presented above. In the case of context biases, convincing indications of, 78	
for example, the preferential copying of individual that are considered prestigious 79	
(prestige bias), have been found in laboratory (Atkisson, O’Brien, & Mesoudi, 2012; 80	
Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012) as well as in ethnographic settings (Henrich 81	
& Broesch, 2011). Other experiments showed that a similar heuristic (“copy 82	
successful individuals”) was used by participants to decide from whom to copy from 83	
(Mesoudi, 2011a).  The empirical evidence for conformity is more scattered, but a 84	
disproportionate tendency to copy the majority (i.e. copying with a probability higher 85	
than the proportion of the majority itself, as conformity is defined in cultural 86	
evolution theory) has been found in experimental settings as well (Efferson, Lalive, 87	
Richerson, McElreath, & Label, 2008; Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 88	
2012; Morgan, Laland, & Harris, 2015). 89	
Content biases have also been studied, mainly using the transmission chain (or 90	
“serial reproduction”) technique (Bartlett, 1932). In these experiments, a short piece 91	
of narrative is iteratively transmitted from one participant to another. It has been 92	
found that some types of content are better remembered and repeated than others, 93	
conferring them a selective cultural advantage. In addition to the previously 94	
mentioned biases for survival-relevant information and emotional content, other 95	
content-based biases that have been studied in cultural evolution are, for example, a 96	
bias for social information (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006), a bias for minimally 97	
counterintuitive concepts –  i.e. concepts that fits our intuitive cognitive expectations 98	
but with few exceptions, such as superheroes, gods, etc. (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001), or a 99	
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bias for negatively marked information (Bebbington, MacLeod, Ellison, & Fay, 100	
2016). 101	
One important, but hitherto largely unexplored, question concerns the relative 102	
importance of context versus content biases. What if the majority prefers A, but B 103	
carries, say, more social information than A? In what follows, we present an 104	
experiment that addresses this question. We used a sample of relatively famous quotes 105	
(such as, for example, “It is better to have loved and lost, than never to have loved at 106	
all”), and we presented them to participants, associated or not, at random, to famous 107	
authors, or associated or not, again randomly, to a previous majority of people that 108	
preferred that quote.  109	
Quotes are a useful test case, as they are relatively discrete units of cultural 110	
information that can be promptly evaluated for their content by participants, and, in 111	
the same time, are easily associated with contextual features. Context is important 112	
because quotes are usually credited to famous people, and they are commonly 113	
misattributed. The quote “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and 114	
over again and expecting a different result”, for example, is often incorrectly 115	
attributed to Albert Einstein. However, the earliest exact match of the quote appears 116	
in a Narcotics Anonymous information pamphlet in 1981, some 25 years after 117	
Einstein’s death1. The fact that most people attribute the quote to Einstein rather than 118	
its true source is suggestive of the value added by fame to the “quotability” of a 119	
phrase. On the other side, content is important because there must be something 120	
particularly appealing about the specific message in a quote – we don’t just quote 121	
anything and everything that a famous person has said. A recent study by Lerique and 122	




transmission in quotations, showing that quotes copied from one website to another 124	
tended to be transformed according to predictable rules, for example replacing 125	
difficult words with simpler synonyms. 126	
In the experiments, we address the following questions: 127	
1) Does the fame of an author associated to a quote influence whether people 128	
like the quote? In addition: does the domain of the quote modulate this influence? Our 129	
hypothesis was that the influence of the association of a prestigious author with a 130	
quote would have been stronger when the author was known as an “expert” of the 131	
quote’s domain (hence the topic “Science” and “Literature” associated with famous 132	
scientists and writers), less strong when the domain of the quote was “Money” or 133	
“Success” (for which famous authors could know more than the average people, 134	
without being experts in the domain), and finally even less for domains, such as 135	
“Love” and “Friendship”, that could be considered common knowledge. 136	
2) Does the popularity of a quote influence whether people like the quote? We 137	
tested here two different hypotheses. The first one is that people would be conformist 138	
in the technical sense defined above, i.e. that they would disproportionally (with a 139	
probability higher than the popularity of the quote itself) prefer a popular quote. The 140	
second – weaker – hypothesis is that popular quote would simply be more preferred 141	
than unpopular one. In addition: does the domain of the quote modulate this 142	
influence? We reasoned that people might attend more to popularity in domains that 143	
do not require expert knowledge, such as “Love” and “Friendship” than ones like 144	
“Science” and “Literature”, or “Money” and “Success”, where common knowledge 145	






We carried out four main experiments. In the first two experiments (experiment 151	
one and two), randomly extracted pairs of quotes of the same domain were assigned 152	
to participants. In experiment one famous and unknown authors were assigned to the 153	
quotes, while in experiment two one quote was presented as “popular” and one was 154	
not. Participants were asked to choose the quote they preferred in the pair.  155	
In the other two experiments (experiment three and four) all participants were 156	
presented with the same quotes. The quotes were associated alternatively with famous 157	
or unknown authors (experiment three) or were considered popular or unpopular 158	
(experiment four). Participants were asked to rate how much they liked each quote. 159	
 160	
Selection of quotes 161	
We selected from the website http://www.quotationspage.com 10 quotes for 162	
each of these six topics: “love”, “friendship”, “money”, “success”, “science”, and 163	
“literature”. We chose quotes that were, according to our judgment, not particularly 164	
recognizable, so that assigning to them an unknown – or wrong – author would not jar 165	
with participants’ prior knowledge about sources. We also chose 4 quotes to use as a 166	
“distractor”, and two quotes to use as a “control” (see below). All quotes were a 167	
single sentence statement, to avoid any bias related to length. The list of the 66 quotes 168	
used in the experiment is provided in Supplementary Material (quotations.pdf). 169	
 170	
Content only evaluation 171	
We recruited 200 participants through crowdflower.com. Each participant was 172	
paid 1.00$ to carry out the task, which took less than five minutes to complete. After 173	
	 8	
completing the task, the participants were debriefed about the aims of the experiment 174	
and given the option to withdraw their data. None of the participants chose this 175	
option. Participants were also informed that some quotes in the experiment were 176	
misattributed and provided a link to the website where the quotes (and authentic 177	
sources) were sourced from. We followed this procedure for all the experiments 178	
described below. The University of Bristol granted the ethical approval for the 179	
experiment. 180	
Participants were asked to help us to “Choose the most inspirational quote” and 181	
presented a questionnaire with seven questions. Each of the seven questions included 182	
a pair of quotes, and the participant was asked to choose the one s/he preferred 183	
between the two - see screenshot in Supplementary Material (screen1.pdf). Six of the 184	
questions had each two quotes randomly selected among the six topics above, and one 185	
“Control” question presented always the same two quotes (randomly associated to a 186	
famous and to an unknown author): one of the quotes was meaningless (“The it then 187	
said it to the boring good morning”). The participants preferring this quote were 188	
excluded from the analysis. Finally, the order of presentation of the quotes was 189	
randomized for each participant. 190	
We collected data from 174 valid participants (26 being excluded because of the 191	
wrong answer in the “control” question). Each of the 60 quotes was presented on 192	
average 34.8 times (SD=5.0, max=46, min=24). 193	
 194	
Selection of “famous” authors  195	
We first extracted names to use as “famous” authors from the Pantheon 1.0 196	
dataset (Yu, Ronen, Hu, Lu, & Hidalgo, 2016; available online at: 197	
pantheon.media.mit.edu). We considered names from the category “people”, with any 198	
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place of birth, and born between 1800 and 2010. We extracted 20 names from the 199	
Pantheon domain “All” (including personalities from all domains), 10 from the 200	
domain “Humanities”, and 10 from the domain “Science & Technology”. We 201	
excluded, in order to avoid biases, women (only Marie Curie, in the “Science & 202	
Technology” domain, and Marilyn Monroe, in the “All” domain, were found) and 203	
possibly controversial political figures from the “all” domain (Karl Marx, Adolf 204	
Hitler, Che Guevara, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Benito Mussolini, and Mao 205	
Zedong). We obtained a total of 30 different famous names (as 10 famous authors 206	
were repeated in different domains, for example Albert Einstein was present both in 207	
the “All” and in the “Science & Technology” domain). 208	
We tested if famous names were indeed recognised as such by participants, 209	
contrasting them with a sample of 30 randomly generated male names (“Unknown” 210	
sample) that was then used for the experiments. The list of famous and unknown 211	
names is provided in Supplementary Material (authors.pdf).  Data were collected from 212	
100 participants recruited through crowdflower.com. Each participant was paid 0.40$ 213	
to complete the task. Participants were asked to help us to “Rate how famous (well-214	
known) contemporary or past celebrities are”. Each participant was presented with 215	
four names, chosen at random in each category (“All”, “Science and Technology”, 216	
“Humanities”, “Unknown”). Each name was presented with a multiple-choice 217	
question (“How famous do you think he is?” with possible answers: “very famous”, 218	
“famous”, “a little famous”, “not famous at all”).  219	
There was a significant difference in the rating of unknown and famous names 220	
in all three categories, demonstrating that participants recognized as famous the 221	
names we extracted from the Pantheon dataset, and not the random names. Small 222	
variations were present in different domains (for example, the names from the 223	
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“Science & Technology” domain were known better than the names from the 224	
“Humanities” domains, data not shown), but all the differences with the unknown 225	
names were significant at the same level (Mann-Whitney U test, all p<0.0001, all 226	
N=100). 227	
 228	
Experiment one: famous versus unknown authors 229	
 230	
Methods 231	
We recruited 200 participants through crowdflower.com. Each participant was 232	
paid 1.30$ to complete the task. As above, subjects were asked to help us to “Choose 233	
the most inspirational quote” and presented a questionnaire with nine questions. Each 234	
of the nine questions included a pair of quotes, and the participant was asked to 235	
choose the one s/he preferred between the two. Table 1 shows how quotes and authors 236	
were assigned to participants. For each topic, two random quotes were selected, and 237	
authors from the samples described in Table 1 were also randomly extracted.  238	
Two questions – not used in the analysis – included two random quotes both 239	
associated to famous or unknown names, respectively. The rationale for including 240	
these two “Distractors” was to avoid participants realizing the hypothesis that we 241	
were testing (which may have been obvious if all the questions pitted a quote by one 242	
famous and one by an unknown author). Finally, the order of presentation of the 243	






TOPIC AUTHOR 1 AUTHOR 2 
Love Famous “All” “Unknown” 
Friendship Famous “All” “Unknown” 
Money Famous “All” “Unknown” 
Success Famous “All” “Unknown” 
Science Famous “Science and Technology” “Unknown” 
Literature Famous “Humanities” “Unknown” 
Distractor 1 “Unknown” “Unknown” 
Distractor 2 Famous “All” Famous “All” 
Control Famous “All” “Unknown” 
 249	




We excluded 39 participants due to preferring the meaningless quote in the 254	
control question, remaining with 161 valid participants. We calculated, for each of the 255	
possible 60 quotes, how many times a quote was preferred when associated to a 256	
famous author (hence “opposing” a quote of the same topic, associated to an unknown 257	
author), and how many time it was preferred when associated to an unknown author. 258	
Each quote was presented on average 32.2 times overall to the 161 valid participants 259	
(SD=5.1, max=48, min=24). We performed, for the three separate categories of topics 260	
(“Love/Friendship”, “Money/Success”, “Science/Literature”), three separate 261	
Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests, comparing the success rate of quotes associated to 262	
famous and to unknown authors. All tests gave non-significant results (p=0.11, 263	
p=0.42, p=0.20, all N=20), indicating that participants did not preferred a quote when 264	
it was associated with a famous authors more than when it was associated to an 265	




Figure 1:  Comparison of quotes’ proportion of wins across the three topic 269	
groups in experiment one (Famous versus Unknown authors). Boxplots show 270	
medians and interquartile ranges, with whiskers extending to 1.5*IQR.  271	
 272	
To test the effect of the content, we used the results provided in the “Content 273	
only Evaluation” (see above) as one of the predictors of two linear models. The first 274	
linear model included, as a response, the success rate of quotes in experiment one 275	
(famous versus unknown authors), and, as the other predictor, the proportion of times 276	
the quote was associated to a famous author in experiment one. The model was 277	
overall significant (p<0.001, R2=0.36), and showed that the proportion of wins in 278	
“Content only Evaluation” (p<0.001, t=5.69), but not the proportion of times the 279	
quote was associated to a famous author in experiment one (p=0.66, t=-0.44) 280	
explained the success in experiment one (see also Figure 2). In other words, 281	
participants evaluated the content of the quotes, but not the fact that they were 282	
associated to a famous author, to choose among them in the “famous versus unknown 283	
























































































































Figure 2:  Fame and content versus quotes’ success. Left panel: Linear regression 287	
of the proportion of times a quote was associated with a famous author in experiment 288	
one versus the proportion of wins in experiment one. The shaded area shows the 95% 289	
confidence interval. Right panel: Linear regression of the proportion of wins in 290	
experiment “Content only Evaluation” versus the proportion of wins in experiment 291	
one. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval. 292	
 293	
Experiment two: popular versus unpopular quotes 294	
 295	
Methods 296	
The structure of experiment two was analogous to experiment one, but instead 297	
of authors, quotes were associated with a popularity score (“N people already chose 298	
this quote”). Using the same arrangement of Table 1, the quote associated to a 299	
“Famous” author was now a “Popular” quote, while the quote associated to an 300	
“Unknown” author was, in experiment two, an “Unpopular” quote. All quotes and 301	
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already chose “Popular” and “Unpopular” quotes were randomly generated with the 303	
constraint that, for each question, unpopular quotes were assigned a random number 304	
of people that already chose them between 100 and 1000, and popular quotes were 305	
presented as chosen approximately by three times more people than unpopular ones. 306	
Following the logic of experiment one, the two quotes in the Distractors were 307	
presented as chosen approximately by the same number of people. 308	
 309	
Results 310	
We analysed the answers from 165 participants (35 were excluded). Each of the 311	
60 quotes was presented on average 33.0 times (SD=4.6, max=46, min=21). We first 312	
checked if participants showed any conformist tendency. A visual inspection of the 313	
data (see Figure 3) clearly shows that this was not the case.  To show a 314	
disproportionate tendency to prefer popular quotes, participants should have preferred 315	
them with a probability higher than the frequency they were presented (3/4 of the total 316	
presumed preferences, see Methods above). Similarly, unpopular quotes should have 317	
been preferred with a probability lower than the frequency presented. In Figure 3, the 318	
shaded area of the plots represents these hypothetical outcomes.  319	
 320	
 321	
Figure 3: Average proportion of wins across the three topic groups in 322	









































were presented to subjects. Bars represented standard deviations of the data. The 324	
shades areas of the plots show where data points would have been expected, if 325	
participants had shown a conformist tendency. 326	
 327	
 In the subsequent analysis we focused on whether popularity still had some 328	
effect on participants' evaluations, even if it was not "conformist" in the technical 329	
sense examined above.  The same analysis of experiment one was conducted for 330	
experiment two (popular versus unpopular quotes). Three Wilcoxon signed-ranked 331	
tests gave here a significant difference between the proportions of wins of “popular” 332	
versus “unpopular” quotes (all p <0.001, all N=20), indicating that participants 333	
preferred “popular” quotes (see Figure 4). As we did not have specific hypotheses on 334	
the role of topic domains for popularity, we did not analyse possible differences in the 335	
results between the three categories of topics. 336	
 337	
 338	
Figure 4:  Comparison of quotes’ proportion of wins across the three topic 339	
groups in experiment two (Popular versus unpopular quotes). Boxplots show 340	
medians and interquartile ranges, with whiskers extending to 1.5*IQR.  341	
 342	
According to the same logic applied to experiment one, we ran a linear model, 343	


























































































































(popular versus unpopular quotes), and two predictors were used: the proportion of 345	
wins in the “Content only evaluation” test and the proportion of times the quote was 346	
“popular” in experiment two. The model was again overall significant (p<0.001, 347	
R2=0.47), but, differently from experiment one, showed that both the proportion of 348	
wins in experiment the “Content only evaluation” test (p<0.001, t=6.28), and, to a 349	
lesser degree, the proportion of times the quote was popular in experiment two 350	
(p<0.005, t=3.37) explained the success in experiment two (see also Figure 5). 351	
 352	
 353	
Figure 5:  Popularity and content versus quotes’ success. Left panel: Linear 354	
regression of the proportion of times a quote was presented as “popular” in 355	
experiment two versus the proportion of wins in experiment two. The shaded area 356	
shows the 95% confidence interval. Right panel: Linear regression of the proportion 357	
of wins in the “Content only evaluation” test versus the proportion of wins in 358	
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Experiment three: Single quotes and fame 362	
 363	
Methods 364	
To avoid any effect of the content of quotes, we ran a second series of 365	
experiments, in which all participants were presented with the same quotes, and the 366	
only variation was the fact that they were associated with Famous or Unknown 367	
authors (Experiment three) or were considered Popular or Unpopular (Experiment 368	
four) 369	
For experiment three we recruited 200 participants through crowdflower.com. 370	
Each participant was paid 0.70$ to complete the task. Participants were again asked to 371	
help us to “Choose the most inspirational quote”, presented a questionnaire with 372	
seven quotes, and informed of the experiment after completing the task, as described 373	
above. Each quote was presented with a multiple-choice question (“How good do you 374	
think this quote is?” with possible answers: “very good”, “good”, “average”, “not 375	
particularly good”).  376	
 All participants were assigned the same seven quotes, six for each of the 377	
possible topics, plus the same “Control” quote described above (see all quotes in 378	
Table 2). The data of participants that answered that the meaningless control quote 379	
was “very good”, “good”, or “average” were discarded. For each of the quotes, half of 380	
the participants were randomly assigned a famous author (from the sample “All”, or 381	
from the sample “Science and Technology” for the topic “Science”, and from the 382	
sample “Humanities” for the topic “Literature”, analogously to experiment 1), and the 383	
other half of participants was assigned a name from the “Unknown” sample. The 384	




Love It is better to have loved and lost, then never to have loved at all 
Friendship The meeting of two personalities is like the contact of two chemical 
substances: if there is any reaction, both are transformed 
Money One of the greatest disservices you can do to a man is to lend him money 
that he can't pay back 
Success If you can break down those walls you've spent so many years building 
to protect yourself, you can achieve anything 
Science Science may set limits to knowledge, but should not set limits to 
imagination 
Literature The man who does not read good books has no advantage over the man 
who can not read them 
Control The it then said it too the boring good morning 
 387	
Table 2:  Quotes used in experiments three and four. 388	
 389	
Results 390	
We discarded 10 participants that evaluated positively the control quote, 391	
remaining with 190 valid subjects. For each topic, we compared the evaluations of the 392	
quote associated with the famous author with the evaluations of the quote associated 393	
with the unknown name. While the former where indeed higher (see Figure 6, upper 394	
panel), the differences were not significant (Mann-Whitney U test, all p>0.05, all 395	
N=190, see Table 3, Left column), consistently with the results of experiment one. 396	
 397	
Experiment four: Single quotes and popularity  398	
 399	
Methods 400	
As above, we kept the same structure of experiment three, and we replaced 401	
“Famous” and “Unknown” authors with “Popular” and “Unpopular” quotes (“N 402	
people think this is a good quote”). The number of people that already chose 403	
“Popular” and “Unpopular” quotes were generated by selecting a random number 404	
between 100 and 1000 for each participant and by multiplying this number by 0.75 for 405	
	 19	
popular quotes and by 0.25 for unpopular ones (adding randomness). In this way we 406	
kept the approximate ratio 1/3 between people who chose popular and unpopular 407	
quotes present in Experiment two. 408	
 409	
Results 410	
 We retained the answers of 198 participants, and compared the evaluations of 411	
the quote presented as “popular” versus the evaluations of the quote presented as 412	
“unpopular”. As above, “popular” quotes were rated higher than the same quotes, 413	
presented as “unpopular” (see Figure 6, lower panel). The difference was significant 414	
for two topics, “Friendship” (Mann-Whitney U test, p<0.005, N=198), and “Science” 415	
(Mann-Whitney U test, p<0.05, N=198) and not significant for the others (Mann-416	
Whitney U test, all p>0.05, all N=198, see also Table 3, Right column). 417	
 418	




Love 0.19 0.46 
Friendship 0.26 0.002** 
Money 0.13 0.24 
Success 0.80 0.38 
Science 0.08 0.01* 
Literature 0.09 0.08 
 419	




Figure 6:  Comparison of quotes’ success across the six topics in experiment 423	
three and four. Upper panel: Percentage of success calculated as CLES (“common 424	
language effect size” McGraw & Wong, 1992; i.e. how many times, given all possible 425	
pairings, the quote in one condition was evaluated higher than the same quote in the 426	
other condition) across topics in experiment three (Single quotes and fame). Notice 427	
the sum for each topic is not 100, as a proportion of pairings resulted in ties. Lower 428	
panel: Percentage of success calculated as CLES across topics in experiment four 429	














































Our experiments gave some indication, contrary to our expectations, that 435	
context-based cultural transmission biases had less effect than the actual content in 436	
determining how participants evaluated the material presented. The first experiment 437	
showed that the fact that a quote was associated or not to a famous author was not 438	
important in determining whether it was preferred or not. The second experiment 439	
showed both that our participants were not conformist – in the technical sense defined 440	
in cultural evolution, i.e. having a disproportionate tendency to copy the majority – 441	
and that, while the perceived popularity of a quote had an effect on their choices, this 442	
effect was relatively small in respect to the effect of the content of the quote itself. 443	
Finally, experiments three and four showed that, when controlling for the content by 444	
presenting the same quote to participants, popularity and prestige had, again, a limited 445	
effect.  We found two significant differences in experiment four, showing that 446	
participants preferred consistently the popular quote in the domains of “Friendship” 447	
and “Science”. However, the effect was present in only two of six domains, and we 448	
did not have theoretical reasons to expect that “Friendship” and “Science” would 449	
show a bigger influence of a popularity bias. We tentatively interpret these two 450	
significant results only suggesting, consistently with the results of experiment two, 451	
that some effect of popularity was present, more than in the case of fame/prestige. 452	
These results may seem surprising, given the apparently common tendency for 453	
people to misattribute quotes to famous people (recall our earlier example of quoting 454	
Einstein, rather than Narcotics Anonymous, on the relationship between repetition 455	
and insanity). While, at first sight, this phenomenon would seem to exemplify prestige 456	
bias, our results suggest that other explanations should be considered. For example, it 457	
	 22	
could be that people remember the content better than who said it, so when they re-458	
tell or “share” the quote they could make errors in attribution. The aggregation of 459	
these errors is likely to lead to more quotes being misattributed to famous people 460	
simply because they are better known (so Einstein is bound to pick up more 461	
accidental misattributions than, say, Bohr, simply because fewer people would know 462	
or remember who Bohr was). According to this interpretation, the success of 463	
quotations would not be the result of being misattributed to famous authors. On the 464	
contrary, misattributions would be the result of the wide diffusion of “good” 465	
quotations. 466	
On a more general level, we may ask how the results of our experiments can 467	
contribute to the broad field of cultural evolution. There are two important features of 468	
the experiment that need to be considered to evaluate the scope of our results. First, 469	
no expertise was required to choose between the alternatives. A basic tenet of cultural 470	
evolution theory is that social information is valuable when individual information is 471	
costly and/or difficult to obtain ("costly information hypothesis" in Boyd & 472	
Richerson, 1985). This was clearly not the case in our scenario, so that it is likely this 473	
may explain why participants did not consider the social cues that were provided with 474	
the quotes (for recent experiments showing the relationship between task difficulty 475	
and (under)use of social information see e.g. Acerbi, Tennie, & Mesoudi, 2016; 476	
Morgan et al., 2012) 477	
The second important feature however was that the choice was, for the 478	
participants, completely cost-free. In this case, previous studies indicate that context-479	
based biases are expected to have an important role. To limit to examples that directly 480	
refer to cultural evolution theory, Coultas (2004) found that university students were 481	
influenced by the majority (but not conformist) about seemingly irrelevant choices 482	
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such as writing a date analogically (“2 February 2017”) or numerically (“2/2/2017”), 483	
or covering or not the keyboard of the public computer they used. Claidière et al. 484	
(2014) showed that the visitors of a zoo, given the opportunity to answer to questions 485	
on a card in exchange of a small prize, wrote (or drew) their contribution according to 486	
what they perceived others visitors did previously. One of the illustrations of prestige-487	
based bias used in cultural evolution, that is, the influence of stars like Michael Jordan 488	
in advertisement (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011), is indeed quite similar to our 489	
scenario, where the task (choosing the underwear’s brand) is cost-free and does not 490	
require expertise. Future studies should systematically test how the variation on the 491	
two axes of task difficulty and task importance may influence the usage of context-492	
based transmission biases and social cues in general.    493	
Our results contribute to a growing body of works that found contrasting results 494	
on the effects of context-based biases. For example, Salganik, Dodds, & Watts (2006) 495	
produced results very similar to our study. Salganik et al. (2006) created an “artificial 496	
market” were individuals could download previously unknown songs and, in the 497	
“social-influence” condition, see how many times the songs have been previously 498	
downloaded. While the study is often cited to support the importance of the influence 499	
of popularity on individual choices, Salganik et al. (2006) found that there was a 500	
strong correlation between the success of songs in the “social influence” condition 501	
and in the control condition, where individuals did not have contextual cues of 502	
popularity, mirroring what happened in our experiments. Notice that, also in this case, 503	
the choice (downloading or not a song) was low-cost and did not require previous 504	
experience.  Similarly, Priestley & Mesoudi (2015) studying the behaviour of users of 505	
the aggregator website Reddit.com, found that social influence (users are more likely 506	
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to up-vote content that others have previously up-voted) had a smaller effect than 507	
expected.  508	
Establishing the relative importance of context and content biases, for cultural 509	
evolutionary studies, is a task that goes beyond the mere need for terminological 510	
precision. Context-based biases are relatively simple, domain-general, heuristics. If 511	
they are the main driving force of cultural evolution, cultural evolution studies should 512	
mainly focus on population-level dynamics. Modelling strategies, or theoretical 513	
approaches, in which the cognitive properties of human individuals are only 514	
minimally sketched will do the job. On the contrary, content-based biases depend on 515	
domain-specific cognitive aspects, and, if the success of practices and ideas depend 516	
mostly on those, cultural evolutionists need to pay particular attention to the subtleties 517	
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